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Abstract: In this paper, we consider a cooperative multi-hop secured transmission protocol to
underlay cognitive radio networks. In the proposed protocol, a secondary source attempts to transmit
its data to a secondary destination with the assistance of multiple secondary relays. In addition,
there exists a secondary eavesdropper who tries to overhear the source data. Under a maximum
interference level required by a primary user, the secondary source and relay nodes must adjust
their transmit power. We first formulate effective signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) as
well as secrecy capacity under the constraints of the maximum transmit power, the interference
threshold and the hardware impairment level. Furthermore, when the hardware impairment level is
relaxed, we derive exact and asymptotic expressions of end-to-end secrecy outage probability over
Rayleigh fading channels by using the recursive method. The derived expressions were verified
by simulations, in which the proposed scheme outperformed the conventional multi-hop direct
transmission protocol.
Keywords: physical-layer security; underlay cognitive radio; cooperative multi-hop transmission;
secrecy outage probability; hardware impairments
1. Introduction
Security is one of the most important issues in wireless communication because of the broadcast
nature of wireless medium. Conventionally, encryption/decryption algorithms that generate
public/private keys are used to guarantee the security [1,2]. Recently, a security framework for the
physical layer, called the wiretap channel or physical-layer security (PLS) [3–11], has been introduced
as a potential solution. In PLS, difference between Shannon capacity of the data link and that of
the eavesdropping link, named secrecy capacity, is commonly used to evaluate secrecy performance
such as average secrecy capacity (ASC), secrecy outage probability (SOP) and probability of non-zero
secrecy capacity (PNSC). Hence, to enhance the secrecy performance for wireless systems, researchers
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proposed efficient communication methods to increase channel capacity of the data links, and/or
decrease that of the eavesdropping links. Indeed, in [12–14], opportunistic relay selection protocols are
considered to enhance the quality of the data channels in one-hop and dual-hop relaying networks.
In [15–18], the authors considered cooperative jamming approaches to reduce the data rate received
at the eavesdroppers. The authors of [19–25] considered the secrecy performance enhancement for
underlay cognitive radio (UCR) networks in which transmit power of secondary users (SUs) is limited
by maximum interference levels required by primary users (PUs). The authors of [26–29] proposed
secure communication protocols for two-way relay networks. In [30–33], the end-to-end secrecy
performance of multi-hop relaying systems is investigated.
Thus far, most published works related to performance evaluation assume that transceiver
hardware of wireless terminals is perfect. However, in practice, it suffers from impairments due to
phase noises, amplifier–amplitude non-linearity and in phase and quadrature imbalance (IQI) [34–36],
which significantly degrade the performance of wireless communication systems. In [37,38], the
authors proposed various relay selection methods to compensate the impact of the hardware
imperfection. The authors of [39] studied the outage performance of partial relay selection and
opportunistic relay selection schemes in the UCR networks under the joint of hardware imperfection
and interference constraint.
To the best of our knowledge, several published works evaluate the secrecy performance under
the impact of imperfect transceiver hardware. In [40], the authors first studied the impact of the
hardware imperfection on the secrecy capacity. In particular, the work in [40] considers the effects of
IQI in one-hop OFDMA communication systems. The authors of [41] designed a secure massive MIMO
system in the presence of a passive multiple-antenna eavesdropper and the hardware impairments.
Reference [42] provided a power-efficient resource allocation algorithm for secure wireless-powered
communication networks with the hardware noises. Taking hardware imperfection into account, the
authors of [43] proposed an optimal power allocation strategy to maximize the instantaneous secrecy
rate of a cooperative amplify-and-forward (AF) relaying scheme. In [44], we calculated PNSC of
multi-hop relay networks over Nakagami-m fading channels in presence of the hardware impairments.
The results in [44] show that the hardware impairments significantly affect on the PNSC performance.
However, there is no published work related to cooperative multi-hop PLS in the UCR networks.
This motivated us to propose such a scheme and evaluate its performance. In the proposed protocol,
named Cooperative Multi-Hop Transmission Protocol (CMT), a secondary source sends its data
to a secondary destination via multiple secondary relays. In addition, in the secondary network,
a secondary eavesdropper overhears the source data transmitted by the source and relay nodes.
In addition, the secondary transmitters must adjust the transmit power to satisfy the interference
constraint required by a PU and a maximal power threshold. The operation of the proposed scheme can
be realized via one or many orthogonal time slots. At each time slot, the current transmitter finds an
intended receiver that is nearest to the destination, and can receive the data securely and successfully.
If this receiver is the destination, the data transmission ends. Otherwise, the procedure is repeated with
the new selected transmitter. We also design a cooperative MAC method at each time slot for reversing
the channel as well as selecting the potential receiver. For performance measurement, we first formulate
the secrecy capacity under joint constraint of the limited interference and the hardware imperfection.
When the hardware impairments are relaxed, we derive exact and asymptotic expressions of the
end-to-end SOP over Rayleigh fading channels by using a recursive expression. Computer simulations
were realized to verify the theoretical derivations as well as to show the advantages of the CMT
method. The results show that the proposed scheme outperformed the conventional multi-hop direct
transmission (MDT) protocol, and parameters such as the imperfect CSI estimations, the number of
intermediate relays, the hardware impairment level and the position of the eavesdropper significantly
affected the end-to-end SOP.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. System model of the proposed scheme is described
in Section 2. In Section 3, exact and asymptotic expressions of the end-to-end SOP for the MDT and
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CMT protocols are derived. The simulation results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents
our conclusions.
2. System Model
As illustrated in Figure 1, we consider an M-hop secondary network, where the source (N0)
communicates with the destination (NM) via M − 1 relay nodes denoted by N1, N2, ..., NM−1. The
relay nodes are numbered according to their distances to the destination, i.e., the relay NM−1 is nearest
and the relay N1 is the furthest. In UCR, the source and the relay nodes must adapt the transmit power
so that the co-channel interference levels caused by their transmission are below a threshold (Ith) given
by a primary user (PU). Moreover, the transmit power of the secondary transmitters is also limited
by a maximum power (Pth). In addition, in the secondary network, the eavesdropper (E) attempts to
overhear the source data transmitted by the secondary transmitters. Before describing the operation of
the proposed protocol, we give assumptions used in this paper.
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Figure 1. System model of the proposed protocol.
As illustrated in Figure 1, we consider an M-hop secondary network, where the source (N0)
communicates with the destination (NM) via M-1 relay nodes denoted by N1, N2, ..., NM−1. The relay
nodes are numbered according to their distances to the destination, i.e., the relay NM−1 is nearest and
the relay N1 is the furthest. In UCR, the source and the relay nodes must adapt the transmit power so
that the co-channel interference levels caused by their transmission are below a threshold (Ith) given
by a primary user (PU). Moreover, the transmit power of the secondary transmitters is also limited
by a maximum power (Pth). In addition, in the secondary network, the eavesdropper (E) attempts to
overhear the source data transmitted by the secondary transmitters. Before describing the operation of
the proposed protocol, we give assumptions used in this paper.
We assume that all of the relays are in the radio range of the source and destination nodes. We
assume that all of the nodes have a single antenna, and the data transmission is hence split into
orthogonal time slots. For ease of presentation and analysis, it is assumed that all of the nodes have the
same structure, and the impairment levels are the same. We also assume that the eavesdropper
is an active node, and hence the secondary nodes can estimate channel state information (CSI)
between themselves and the node E [45]. Next, the data transmission between two secondary nodes
is considered to be secure and successful if the obtained secrecy capacity is higher than a positive
threshold (RS). Otherwise, the data are assumed to be intercepted, which is referred to as a secrecy
outage event.
2.1. Channel and Hardware Impairment Models
Let dNi ,Nj , dNi ,PU and dNi ,E denote distances of the Ni → Nj, Ni → PU and Ni → E links,
respectively, where i, j ∈ {0, 1, ..., M− 1, M}. We also denote hNi ,Nj , hNi ,PU and hNi ,E as channel
coefficients of Ni → Nj, Ni → PU and Ni → E links, respectively. Because the channels experience
a Rayleigh fading distribution, the channel gains such as γi,j = |hNi ,Nj |2, γi,P = |hNi ,PU|2 and γi,E =
|hNi ,E|2 follow exponential distributions. To take path-loss into account, we can model the parameters
of the random variables (RVs) γi,j, γi,P and γi,E as [46]: λi,j = d
β
Ni ,Nj
, λi,P = d
β
Ni ,PU
and λi,E = d
β
Ni ,E
,
where β is path-loss exponent.
Considering the data transmission between the transmitter X and the receiver Y (X ∈
{N0, N1, ..., NM−1}, Y ∈ {N1, N2, ..., NM, E, PU}), the received data at Y is given as in [34–36]:
y =
√
PXhX,Y (x0 + ηt,X) + ηr,Y + νY, (1)
where x0 is the source data, PX is the transmit power of X, hX,Y is channel coefficient of the X-Y link,
ηt,X and ηr,Y are hardware noises at X and Y, respectively, and νY is Gaussian noise at Y.
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We assume that all of the relays are in the radio range of the source and destination nodes.
We assume that all of the nodes have a single antenna, and the data transmission is hence split into
orthogonal time slots. For ease of presentation and analysis, it is assumed that all of the nodes have the
same structure, and the impairment levels are the same. We also assume that the eavesdr pper
is an ac ive node, and h nc the secondary nod s can estimate channel state information (CSI)
between the selves and the node E [45]. Next, the data transmission between two secondary nodes
is considered to be secure and successful if the obtained secrecy capacity is higher than a positive
threshold (RS). Otherwise, the data are assumed to be intercepted, which is referred to as a secrecy
outage event.
2.1. Channel and Hardware Impairment Models
Let dNi ,Nj , dNi ,PU and dNi ,E deno e distances of th Ni → Nj, Ni → PU and Ni → E links,
respectively, where i, j ∈ {0, 1, ..., M− 1, M}. We also denote hNi ,Nj , hNi ,PU a d hNi ,E as channel
coefficients of Ni → Nj, Ni → PU and Ni → E links, respectively. Because the channels experience
a Rayleigh fading distribution, the channel gains such as γi,j = |hNi ,Nj |2, γi,P = |hNi ,PU|2 and γi,E =
|hNi ,E|2 follow exponential distributions. To take path-loss into account, we can model the parameters
of the random variables (RVs) γi,j, γi,P and γi,E as [46]: λi,j = d
β
Ni ,Nj
, λi,P = d
β
Ni ,PU
and λi,E = d
β
Ni ,E
,
where β is path-loss exponent.
Considering the data transmission between the transmitter X and the receiver Y (X ∈
{N0, N1, ..., NM−1}, Y ∈ {N1, N2, ..., NM, E, PU}), the received data at Y is given as in [34–36]:
y =
√
PXhX,Y (x0 + ηt,X) + ηr,Y + νY, (1)
where x0 is the source data, PX is the transmit power of X, hX,Y is channel coefficient of the X-Y link,
ηt,X and ηr,Y are hardware noises at X and Y, respectively, and νY is Gaussian noise at Y.
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Similar to the work in [34–36], ηt,X, ηr,Y and νY are modeled as Gaussian random variables (RVs)
with zero-mean and their variances are given, respectively, as
var {ηt,X}=τ2t , var {ηr,Y}=τ2r PX|hX,Y|2, var {νY}=σ20 , (2)
where τ2t and τ
2
r are levels of the hardware impairments at X and Y, respectively.
From Equations (1) and (2), the instantaneous signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) is
formulated by
ΨX,Y =
PX|hX,Y|2(
τ2t + τ
2
r
)
PX|hX,Y|2 + σ20
=
PX|hX,Y|2
κPX|hX,Y|2 + σ20
, (3)
where κ = τ2t + τ
2
r is the total hardware impairment level.
Let us consider the transmit power PX of the node X in the underlay CR network. Firstly, PX is
below the maximum transmit power, i.e., PX ≤ Pth. Secondly, the interference caused at the PU due to
the transmission of the node X must be below the interference threshold Ith, i.e.,
PX ≤ Ith
(1+ κ) |hX,PU|2 . (4)
Therefore, PX can be given as
PX = min
(
Pth,
Ith
(1+ κ) |hX,PU|2
)
= Pth min
(
1,
µ
(1+ κ) |hX,PU|2
)
, (5)
where µ = Ith/Pth is assumed to be a constant.
Combining Equations (3) and (5) yields
ΨX,Y =
Pmin
(
1, µ
(1+κ)|hX,PU|2
)
|hX,Y|2
κPmin
(
1, µ
(1+κ)|hX,PU|2
)
|hX,Y|2 + 1
, (6)
where P = Pth/σ20 .
From Equation (6), we can formulate the SINR for the Ni → Nj and Ni → E links, where
i, j ∈ {0, 1, ..., M}, respectively, as
Ψi,j =
Pmin (1, µ/γi,P) γi,j
κPmin (1, µ/γi,P) γi,j + 1
,
Ψi,E =
Pmin (1, µ/γi,P) γi,E
κPmin (1, µ/γi,P) γi,E + 1
. (7)
Moreover, when the transceiver hardware of all the nodes is perfect, i.e., κ = κ2t = κ
2
r = 0, we can
rewrite Equation (7) as
Ψi,j = Pmin
(
1,
µ
γi,P
)
γi,j,
Ψi,E = Pmin
(
1,
µ
γi,P
)
γi,E. (8)
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Hence, the secrecy capacity obtained at Nj due to the transmission of Ni is calculated as
Ri,j = max
(
0, log2
(
1+Ψi,j
)− log2 (1+Ψi,E))
=
[
log2
(
1+Ψi,j
1+Ψi,E
)]+
, (9)
where [x]+ = max (0, x).
From Equations (7) and (9), because Ψi,j
P→+∞≈ 1/κ and Ψi,E P→+∞≈ 1/κ, the secrecy capacity at
high P regime can be given as
Ri,j
P→+∞≈
[
log2
(
1+ 1/κ
1+ 1/κ
)]+
= 0. (10)
Moreover, as κ = 0, we have
Ri,j =
[
log2
(
1+ Pmin (1, µ/γi,P) γi,j
1+ Pmin (1, µ/γi,P) γi,E
)]+
P→+∞≈
[
log2
(
γi,j
γi,E
)]+
. (11)
2.2. Operation of the Proposed Protocol
Next, we describe the operation of the proposed protocol, in which a MAC layer operation is
designed to reverse the channel. Similar to the CoopMAC proposed in [47], in the first time slot, before
transmitting the data, the source sends a request-to-send (RTS) message to the destination and all
of the relays. By receiving this message, all of the nodes can estimate CSI between themselves and
the source, calculate the instantaneous secrecy capacity by using Equation (9), and compare with
RS. It is assumed that the source can exactly estimate the channel coefficients of the interference and
eavesdropping links, and include these values into the RTS message. If the destination can receive the
source data securely and successfully, i.e., R0,M ≥ RS, it will feedback a clear-to-send (CTS) message
to inform. In this case, the source directly sends the data to the destination without using the relays.
In the case where R0,M < RS, the destination has to generate a non-CTS message to request the help
of the relays. Now, let us denote U1 =
{
N11 , N12 , ..., N1r1
}
as set of the potential relays which can
receive the data securely and successfully, i.e., R0,1u ≥ RS, where u = 1, 2, ..., r1, 0 ≤ r1 ≤ M − 1,
N1u ∈ {N1, N2, ..., NM−1}. To select the relay for the retransmission, we also propose a distributed
relay selection method. Similar to the work in [48], the relay N1u will set a timer given as
ω1u =
A
λ1u ,M
, (12)
where A is a predetermined constant.
Then, the relay whose timer expires first will broadcast the CTS message, and it be selected to
retransmit the data to the destination. We can observe from Equation (12) that the selected relay is
nearest to the destination. It is worth noting that, if the set U1 is empty (r1 = 0), no relay node can
retransmit the data to the destination, and this case is considereda secrecy outage event. In the case
where r1 ≥ 1, the operation will be repeated with the new source.
Generally, at the kth time slot (k ≥ 1), assume that the current source is Nik , ik ∈ {0, 1, ..., M− 1}
and i1 = 0. LetWk =
{
Nik+1, Nik+2, ..., NM
}
denote set of relays from the node Nik+1 to the destination.
Similarly, Nik sends the RTS message to all of the nodes belonging to Wk. Then, if Rik ,M ≥ RS, the
destination generates the CTS message, and Nik will directly transmit the data to NM. Otherwise,
the potential relay which belongs to Wk and is nearest to the destination will become the new source
and repeat the process that Nik did. Indeed, we denote Uk as the set of the potential relays, i.e.,
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Uk =
{
Nk1 , Nk2 , ..., Nkrk
}
, where Uk ⊂ Wk, 0 ≤ rk ≤ M − ik. In addition, let us denote Zk ={
Nkrk+1 , Nkrk+2 , ..., NM−ik
}
as set of the nodes that cannot receive the data securely, where krk+1 <
krk+2 < ... < kM−ik and NkM−ik ≡ NM. Then, assume that k1 < k2 < ... < krk and rk ≥ 1, using the relay
selection method described above, the relay Nkr will become the new source at the (k+ 1)th time slot.
This process is only stopped when NM can securely and successfully receive the data or there is
no relay between the current source and the destination that can securely and successfully receive
the data. It is noted that, to avoid the eavesdropper and combine the received data with maximal
ratio combining (MRC) technique, the source and the selected relays use randomize-and-forward (RF)
method [49,50].
In the proposed protocol, to select the successful relay at each time slot correctly, the CSI
estimations over the data, interference and eavesdropping links are assumed to be perfect. However,
in practice, the estimations may not be correct due to the time variation of the channel, finite number
of pilot symbols and noises. Hence, we will discuss this problem in the next sub-section.
2.3. Imperfect Channel Estimation
In this subsection, we consider the imperfect channel estimation at the transmitter Ni and the
receiver Nj. From Equation (9), if Nj wants to calculate the secrecy capacity Ri,j, it has to estimate the
channel coefficient hNi ,Nj correctly. In addition, Ni has to estimate the channel coefficients hNi ,PU and
hNi ,E, which are then sent to Nj through the RTS message.
Let heNi ,Nj , h
e
Ni ,PU
and heNi ,E denote the estimated CSIs of hNi ,Nj , h
e
Ni ,PU
and hNi ,E, respectively;
the correlation between heNi ,Nj and hNi ,Nj ; h
e
Ni ,PU
and hNi ,PU; and h
e
Ni ,E
and hNi ,E can be expressed,
respectively as in [51]:
heNi ,Nj = φDhNi ,Nj +
√
1− φ2DεD,
heNi ,PU = φPhNi ,PU +
√
1− φ2PεP,
heNi ,E = φEhNi ,E +
√
1− φ2EεE, (13)
where φD, φP and φE are channel correlation factors, and εD, εP and εE are estimation errors. We can
observe that if φD = φP = φE = 1, all of the channel estimations are perfect. If φD < 1, φP < 1, φE < 1,
the channel estimations have errors, and the estimated secrecy capacity in Equation (9) is written by
Rei,j =
log2
 1+ Pmin
(
1, µγei,P
)
γei,j
1+ Pmin
(
1, µγei,P
)
γei,E


+
, (14)
where γei,j = |heNi ,Nj |2, γei,P = |heNi ,PU|2 and γei,E = |heNi ,E|2. Again, we note that the CSI estimation errors
may lead to the incorrect relay selection, which would degrade the system performance.
2.4. Multi-Hop Direct Transmission Protocol
To show the advantages of the proposed protocol, we compared the secrecy performance
of the proposed protocol with that of the conventional multi-hop direct transmission protocol
(MDT) [44]. In the MDT scheme, the data are transmitted hop-by-hop from the source to the destination.
Particularly, the data transmission is split into M orthogonal time slots. At the mth time slot, where
m = 1, 2, ..., M, the node Nm transmits the source data to the node Nm+1. If the communication between
Nm and Nm+1 is secure and successful, Nm+1 will forward the data to the next hop in the next time
slot. Otherwise, the data transmission is insecure and the secrecy outage event occurs. Similar to the
MCT protocol, the source and relays in the MDT protocol use the RF technique.
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3. Performance Analysis
Firstly, we can formulate SOP of the Ni → Nj link as
SOPDTi,j = Pr
(
Ri,j < RS
)
= Pr
(
1+Ψi,j
1+Ψi,E
< ρ
)
, (15)
where ρ = 2RS (ρ > 1).
From Equations (9) and (15), it is straightforward that, if κ > 0, then
SOPDTi,j
P→+∞≈ 1. (16)
When the transceiver hardware is perfect (κ = 0), we can derive the exact closed-form expression
for SOPDTi,j . At first, setting x = γi,P, SOP
DT
i,j conditioned on x can be given by
SOPDTi,j (x) = Pr
(
γi,j <
ρ− 1
Pmin (1, µ/x)
+ ργi,E
)
. (17)
Due to the independence of γi,j and γi,E, we can write
SOPDTi,j (x) =
∫ +∞
0
fγi,E (y) Fγij
(
ρ− 1
Pmin (1, µ/x)
+ ρy
)
dy. (18)
Substituting probability density function (PDF) of the exponential RV γi,E(
fγi,E (y) = λi,E exp (−λi,Ey)
)
, and the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the exponential RV
γi,j γi,E
(
Fγi,j (y) = 1− exp
(−λi,jy)) into Equation (18), after some manipulations, we obtain
SOPDTi,j (x) = 1−
λi,E
λi,E + λi,jρ
exp
(
− ρ− 1
Pmin (1, µ/x)
)
. (19)
Then, SOPDTi,j can be obtained from SOP
DT
i,j (x) by
SOPDTi,j =
∫ +∞
0
SOPDTi,j (x) fγi,P (x) dx. (20)
Substituting Equation (19) and fγi,P (y) = λi,P exp (−λi,Py) into Equation (20), we obtain an exact
closed-form expression of SOPDTi,j as
SOPDTi,j =
∫ µ
0
(
1− λi,E
λi,E + λi,jρ
exp
(
−ρ− 1
P
))
λi,P exp (−λi,Px) dx
+
∫ +∞
µ
(
1− λi,E
λi,E + λi,jρ
exp
(
−ρ− 1
Pµ
x
))
λi,P exp (−λi,Px) dx
=1− λi,E
λi,E+λi,jρ
[
(1− exp(−λi,Pµ)) exp
(
−λi,j ρ−1P
)
+
λi,PPµ
λi,PPµ+λi,j (ρ−1) exp
(
−λi,Pµ− λi,j ρ−1P
)]
. (21)
Furthermore, using the approximation in Equation (11), an asymptotic closed-form expression for
SOPDTi,j at high P values can be provided by
SOPDTi,j
P→+∞≈ Pr
(
γi,j
γi,E
< ρ
)
= 1− λi,E
λi,E + λi,jρ
. (22)
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3.1. Multi-hop Direct Transmission Protocol (MDT)
Because the transmission on each hop is independent, the end-to-end SOP of the MDT protocol
can be given as
SOPMDT0,M = 1−
M
∏
m=1
(
1− SOPDTm−1,m
)
. (23)
As κ = 0, substituting Equation (21) into Equation (23), we obtain an exact closed-form expression
for the end-to-end SOP of the MDT protocol as
SOPMDT0,M =1−
M
∏
m=1
 λm−1,Eλm−1,E + λi,jρ
 (1− exp (−λm−1,Pµ)) exp(−λm−1,m ρ−1P )
+
λm−1,PPµ
λm−1,PPµ+λm−1,m(ρ−1) exp
(
−λm−1,Pµ− λm−1,m ρ−1P
) . (24)
At high P regions, using Equation (22), an approximate expression for Equation (24) can be
obtained by
SOPMDT0,M
P→+∞≈ 1−
M
∏
m=1
λm−1,E
λm−1,E + λm−1,mρ
. (25)
3.2. Cooperative Multi-Hop Transmission Protocol (CMT)
In the CMT protocol, the end-to-end SOP is expressed by a recursive expression as follows:
SOPCMTNik ,Uk
=∑
Uk
Pr

1+Ψik ,k1
1+Ψik ,E
≥ ρ, 1+Ψik ,k21+Ψik ,E ≥ ρ, ...,
1+Ψik ,krk
1+Ψik ,E
≥ ρ,
1+Ψik ,krk+1
1+Ψik ,E
< ρ,
1+Ψik ,krk+2
1+Ψik ,E
< ρ, ...,
1+Ψik ,kM−ik
1+Ψik ,E
< ρ

=∑
Uk
Pr

1+Pmin
(
1,µ/γik ,P
)
γik ,k1
1+Pmin
(
1,µ/γik ,P
)
γik ,E
≥ ρ, 1+Pmin
(
1,µ/γik ,P
)
γik ,k2
1+Pmin
(
1,µ/γik ,P
)
γik ,E
≥ ρ, ...,
1+Pmin
(
1,µ/γik ,P
)
γik ,krk
1+Pmin
(
1,µ/γik ,P
)
γik ,E
≥ ρ,
1+Pmin
(
1,µ/γik ,P
)
γik ,krk+1
1+Pmin
(
1,µ/γik ,P
)
γik ,E
< ρ,
1+Pmin
(
1,µ/γik ,P
)
γik ,krk+2
1+Pmin
(
1,µ/γik ,P
)
γik ,E
< ρ, ...,
1+Pmin
(
1,µ/γik ,P
)
γik ,kM−ik
1+Pmin
(
1,µ/γik ,P
)
γik ,E
< ρ

, (26)
where SOPCMTNik ,Uk
is SOP at kth time slot, k = 1, 2, ..., M. Then, the end-to-end SOP of the CMT protocol
is given as
SOPCMT0,M = SOP
CMT
N0,U1 . (27)
Before calculating SOPCMTNik ,Uk
, we give an example with M = 3, where SOPCMT0,3 is expressed by
SOPCMT0,3 = SOP
CMT
N0,{∅} + SOP
CMT
N0,{N1} + SOP
CMT
N0,{N2}
+ SOPCMTN0,{N1,N2}. (28)
Equation (28) shows that there are 04 possible cases for the set U1, i.e., U1 = {∅}, U1 = {N1},
U1 = {N2}, U1 = {N1, N2}. In Equation (28), the terms SOPCMTN0,{∅} and SOP
CMT
N0,{N2} can be calculated as
in (32). Considering the term SOPCMTN0,{N1}, which can be written by
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SOPCMTN0,{N1} = SOP
CMT
N1,U2 = SOP
CMT
N1,{∅} + SOP
CMT
N1,{N2}. (29)
In Equation (29), there are two possible cases for the set U2, i.e., U2 = {∅}, U2 = {N2}, and
SOPCMTN1,{∅} and SOP
CMT
N1,{N2} are SOP at the second time slots. In addition, SOP
CMT
N1,{∅} is calculated by
Equation (32), while SOPCMTN1,{N2} is expressed by
SOPCMTN1,{N2} = SOP
DT
2,3 , (30)
where, because the transmission between N2 and N3 is direct, Equation (21) is used to calculate
SOPCMTN1,{N2}.
Next, let us consider the term SOPCMTN0,{N1,N2} in Equation (28), where the relay N2 will be selected
for retransmitting the data to the destination. Similar to Equation (30), we have
SOPCMTN0,{N1,N2} = SOP
DT
2,3 . (31)
Now, the recursive expression of SOPCMTNik ,Uk
is given as in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. When κ = 0, SOPCMTNik ,Uk
can be expressed as
SOPCMTNik ,Uk
=∑
Uk
λik ,E
λik ,E +
rk
∑
t=1
λik ,ktρ

exp
(
−
rk
∑
t=1
λik ,kt
(ρ−1)
P
) (
1− exp (−λik ,Pµ))
+
λik ,P
Pµ
λik ,P
Pµ+
rk
∑
t=1
λik ,kt
(ρ−1)
exp
(
−λik ,Pµ−
rk
∑
t=1
λik ,kt
(ρ−1)
P
)

+∑
Uk
M−ik−rk
∑
v=1
(−1)v
M−ik−rk
∑
Nj1 ,...,Njv∈Zk
j1<j2<...<jv
λik ,E
λik ,E +
(
v
∑
t=1
λik ,jv +
rk
∑
t=1
λik ,kt
)
ρ
×

exp
(
−
(
v
∑
t=1
λik ,jv +
rk
∑
t=1
λik ,kt
)
ρ−1
P
) (
1− exp (−λik ,Pµ))
+
λik ,P
Pµ
λik ,P
Pµ+
(
λik ,E
+
rk
∑
t=1
λik ,kt
)
(ρ−1)
exp
(
−λik ,Pµ−
(
v
∑
t=1
λik ,jv +
rk
∑
t=1
λik ,kt
)
ρ−1
P
)
 . (32)
Proof. At first, we set x = γik ,E and y = γik ,P, and SOP
CMT
Nik ,Uk
conditioned on x and y can be given by
SOPCMTNik ,Uk (
x, y)
=∑
Uk
[
rk
∏
t=1
exp
(
−λik ,kt
(
ρ− 1
Pmin (1, µ/y)
+ ρx
)) M−ik−rk
∏
v=1
(
1− exp
(
−λik ,kv
(
ρ− 1
Pmin (1, µ/y)
+ ρx
)))]
=∑
Uk
exp
(
−
rk
∑
t=1
λik ,kt
(
ρ− 1
Pmin (1, µ/y)
+ ρx
))
+∑
Uk
M−ik−rk
∑
v=1
(−1)v
M−ik−rk
∑
Nj1 ,...,Njv∈Zk
j1<j2<...<jv
exp
(
−
(
v
∑
t=1
λik ,jv +
rk
∑
t=1
λik ,kt
)(
ρ− 1
Pmin (1, µ/y)
+ ρx
))
. (33)
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Then, SOPCMTNik ,Uk
is obtained from SOPCMTNik ,Uk (
x, y) by
SOPCMTNik ,Uk
=
∫ +∞
0
fγik ,P (y)
[∫ +∞
0
fγik ,E (x) SOP
CMT
Nik ,Uk (
x, y) dx
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1
dy. (34)
Let us consider the integral I1 marked in Equation (34); combining the PDF fγik ,E and
Equation (33), after some careful manipulations, we obtain
I1 =∑
Uk
λik ,E
λik ,E +
rk
∑
t=1
λik ,ktρ
exp
(
−
rk
∑
t=1
λik ,kt (ρ− 1)
Pmin (1, µ/y)
)
+∑
Uk
M−ik−rk
∑
v=1
(−1)v
M−ik−rk
∑
Nj1 ,...,Njv∈Zk
j1<j2<...<jv
λik ,E
λik ,E +
(
v
∑
t=1
λik ,jv +
rk
∑
t=1
λik ,kt
)
ρ
× exp
(
−
(
v
∑
t=1
λik ,jv +
rk
∑
t=1
λik ,kt
)
ρ− 1
Pmin (1, µ/y)
)
. (35)
Next, substituting Equation (35) into Equation (34), and after some manipulations, we obtain
Equation (32) and finish the proof.
Then, at high transmit power, i.e., P→ +∞, using Equation (11), and with the same manner as
derived in Equation (32), an asymptotic expression of SOPCMTNik ,Uk
can be given by
SOPCMTNik ,Uk
P→+∞≈ ∑
Uk
λik ,E
λik ,E +
rk
∑
t=1
λik ,ktρ
+∑
Uk
M−ik−rk
∑
v=1
(−1)v
M−ik−rk
∑
Nj1 ,...,Njv∈Zk
j1<j2<...<jv
λik ,E
λik ,E+
(
v
∑
t=1
λik ,jv+
rk
∑
t=1
λik ,kt
)
ρ
. (36)
Finally, it is worth noting from Equations (25) and (36) that the asymptotic formulas of SOP do
not depend on P.
4. Simulation Results
In this section, we present various Monte Carlo simulations to verify the theoretical results derived
in Section 3. For the simulation environment, we considered a two-dimensional network in which
the co-ordinate of the node Ni (i = 0, 1, ..., M), the primary user, and the eavesdropper are (0, i/M),
(xPU, yPU) and (xE, yE), respectively. To focus on investigating the impact of the important system
parameters on the system performance, in all of the simulations, the path-loss exponent β was fixed
by 3.
In Figure 2, we present the end-to-end SOP of the MDT and CMT protocols as a function of the
transmit SNR
(
P = Pth/σ20
)
in dB, and investigate the impact of the CSI estimation errors on the secrecy
performance. In this simulation, we assumed the CSI estimations of the interference links are correct,
i.e., φP = 1, and the transceiver hardware is perfect, i.e., κ = 0. We also set the simulation parameters
as follows: the target rate RS = 0.2, the ratio µ = 0.5, and the number of hops M = 3. In addition, we
placed the primary user and the eavesdropper at the positions (−0.5, −1) and (0.5, 0.5), respectively.
As shown in Figure 2, when the estimations of the data and eavesdropping channels were correct,
i.e., φD = φE = 1, the performance of the proposed protocol (CMT) was much better than that of the
MDT protocol. However, the SOP performance of the CMT protocol significantly decreased with the
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CSI estimation errors. Moreover, when φD = 0.95 and φE = 0.9, the MDT protocol outperformed the
proposed protocol.
In Figure 3, we present the end-to-end SOP of the MDT and CMT protocols as a function of the
transmit SNR
(
P = Pth/σ20
)
in dB when all of the channel estimations are perfect, i.e., φD = φP = φE = 1.
As we can see, the proposed protocol (CMT) outperformed the MDT protocol for all the P values
because the destination and the intermediate relays in the CMT protocol could obtain higher diversity
gain as compared with those in the MDT protocol. As a result, the proposed protocol enhanced the
channel capacity of the data links, which hence provided better secrecy performance. In addition, it
was observed that, when the transceiver hardware was perfect (κ = 0), the secrecy performance of
both protocols converged to the asymptotic results, which were independent of the P values. However,
as κ = 0.2, the values of SOP reached 1 at high region, which validated the statement in Section 3.
Moreover, there existed a value of P at which the value of SOP was lowest. As shown in this figure, the
optimal transmit SNRs in the CMT and MDT protocols were −5 dB and −7.5 dB, respectively. Finally,
it is worth noting that the simulation results (Sim) match very well with the theoretical results (Exact),
and, at high P regimes, the simulation results nicely converge to the asymptotic ones (Asym). These
validate the correction of our derivations expressed in Section 3.
Entropy 2019, xx, 5 11 of 16
 
 
SO
P
P (dB) 
 MDT-Sim
 MDT-Exact
 MDT-Asym
 CMT-Sim(
D
=0.95,
E
=0.9)
 CMT-Sim(
D
=1,
E
=0.95)
 CMT-Sim(
D
=1,
E
=0.999)
 CMT-Sim(
D
=
E
=1) 
 CMT-Exact(
D
=
E
=1)
 CMT-Asym(
D
=
E
=1)
Figure 2. End-to-end secrecy outage probability (SOP) as function of P in dB when P ∈ [−15 dB, 20 dB],
µ = 0.5, M = 3, RS = 0.2, κ = 0, (xPU, yPU) = (−0.5, −1) and (xE, yE) = (0.5, 0.5).
the CSI estimation errors. Moreover, when φD = 0.95 and φE = 0.9, the MDT protocol outperformed
the proposed protocol.
 
 
SO
P
P dB  
 MDT-Sim( =0.2)
 CMT-Sim( =0.2)
 MDT-Sim( =0)
 CMT-Sim( =0)
 MDT-Exact
 MDT-Asym
 CMT-Exact
 CMT-Asym
Figure 3. End-to-end secrecy outage probability (SOP) as function of P in dB when P ∈ [−15 dB, 25 dB],
µ = 0.5, M = 4, RS = 1, κ ∈ {0, 0.2}, (xPU, yPU) = (−0.5, −1), (xE, yE) = (0.5, 0.5) and φD = φP =
φE = 1.
In Figure 3, we present the end-to-end SOP of the MDT and CMT protocols as a function of the
transmit SNR
(
P = Pth/σ20
)
in dB when all of the channel estimations are perfect, i.e., φD = φP = φE =
1. As we can see, the proposed protocol (CMT) outperformed the MDT protocol for all the P values
because the destination and the intermediate relays in the CMT protocol could obtain higher diversity
gain as compared with those in the MDT protocol. As a result, the proposed protocol enhanced the
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µ = 0.5, M = 3, RS = 0.2, κ = 0, (xPU, yPU) = (−0.5, −1) and (xE, yE) = (0.5, 0.5).
As shown in Figure 4, we changed the number of hops (M) and observed the variant of the
end-to-end SOP. We assigned the values of P, µ, RS, xPU, yPU, xE, and yE as 5 dB, 1, 0.5, −0.5, −0.5, 0.5
and 0.5, respectively. As observed, with the perfect transceiver, the secrecy performance of the MDT
and CMT protocols was better when the number of hops increased. For the CMT protocol, this result
is still true with the presence of the hardware imperfection (κ = 0.1), while the performance of the
MDT protocol severely degraded with higher number of hops. Again, the results in this figure validate
the theoretical results provided in the previous section.
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channel capacity of the data links, which hence provided better secrecy performance. In addition, it
was observed that, when the transceiver hardware was perfect (κ = 0), the secrecy performance of
both protocols converged to the asymptotic results, which were independent of the P values. However,
as κ = 0.2, the values of SOP reached 1 at high region, which validated the statement in Section 3.
Moreover, there existed a value of P at which the value of SOP was lowest. As shown in this figure, the
optimal transmit SNRs in the CMT and MDT protocols were −5 dB and −7.5 dB, respectively. Finally,
it is worth noting that the simulation results (Sim) match very well with the theoretical results (Exact),
and, at high P regimes, the simulation results nicely converge to the asymptotic ones (Asym). These
validate the correction of our derivations expressed in Section 3.
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end-to-end SOP. We assigned the values of P, µ, RS, xPU, yPU, xE, and yE as 5 dB, 1, 0.5, −0.5, −0.5, 0.5
and 0.5, respectively. As observed, with the perfect transceiver, the secrecy performance of the MDT
and CMT protocols was better when the number of hops increased. For the CMT protocol, this result
is still true with the presence of the hardware imperfection (κ = 0.1), while the performance of the
MDT protocol severely degraded with higher number of hops. Again, the results in this figure validate
the theoretical results provided in the previous section.
Figure 5 presents the impact of the hardware impairment level (κ) on the secrecy performance
of the CMT and MDT protocols when P = 0 dB, µ = 1, M = 4, xPU = −0.5, yPU = −1, xE = 0.5 and
yE = 0.5. Similarly, the proposed scheme obtained better performance, as compared the MDT scheme.
It is also seen in Figure 5 that the SOP values rapidly increase as the κ value increases. In addition, the
performance of the considered methods significantly enhanced with lower value of the target rate RS.
As shown in Figure 6, we studied the effect of the positions of the eavesdropper on the end-to-end
SOP. In particular, we fixed the value of yE while changing xE from 0 to 1. The remaining parameters
were set as: P = 10 dB, µ = 1, M = 4, RS = 1, κ = 0, xPU = −0.5 and yPU = −0.1. It can be seen that
the end-to-end SOP of the CMT protocol mostly decreased with the increasing of xE, while that of the
MDT increased at small xE value and decreased at high xE region. We can see in this figure that the
performance of the MDT protocol was worst when xE was about 0.4.
Figure 4. End-to-end secrecy outage probability (SOP) as function of M when P = 5 dB, µ = 1, M ∈
[1, 10], RS = 0.5, κ ∈ {0, 0.1}, (xPU, yPU) = (−0.5, −0.5), (xE, yE) = (0.5, 0.5) and φD = φP = φE = 1.
Figure 5 presents the impact of the hardware impairment level (κ) on the secrecy performance
of the CMT and MDT protocols when P = 0 dB, µ = 1, M = 4, xPU = −0.5, yPU = −1, xE = 0.5 and
yE = 0.5. Similarly, the proposed scheme obtained better performance, as compared the MDT scheme.
It is also seen in Figure 5 that the SOP values rapidly increase as the κ value increases. In addition, the
performance of the consid ed methods significantly enhanced with lower value of the target rat RS.
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As shown in Figure 6, we studied the effect of the positions of the eavesdropper on the end-to-end
SOP. In particular, we fixed the value of yE while changing xE from 0 to 1. The remaining parameters
were set as: P = 10 dB, µ = 1, M = 4, RS = 1, κ = 0, xPU = −0.5 and yPU = −0.1. It can be seen that
the end-to-end SOP of the CMT protocol mostly decreased with the increasing of xE, while that of the
MDT increased at small xE value and decreased at high xE region. We can see in this figure that the
performance of the MDT protocol was worst when xE was about 0.4.
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5. Conclusions
In this paper, we propose the cooperative multi-hop transmission protocol (CMT) in the UCR
networks with the presence of an eavesdropper. Because the proposed scheme uses cooperative
multi-hop transmission, it significantly outperforms the conventional multi-hop direct transmission
protocol (MDT), in terms of the end-to-end secrecy outage probability (SOP). The interesting results
obtained in this paper can be listed as follows:
• The secrecy performance of the proposed protocol was much better than that of the MDT
protocol when the CSI estimations of the data, interference and eavesdropping links were perfect.
Otherwise, the SOP performance significantly degraded due to the incorrect relay selection.
• When the transceiver hardware of the nodes was imperfect, the secrecy performance severely
degraded. In particular, the value of the end-to-end SOP rapidly increased with higher transmit
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and with higher impairment level.
• In the presence of the hardware noises, there existed an optimal value of the transmit SNR,
at which the secrecy performance of the CMT and DMT schemes was best.
• The performance of the proposed protocol was better when the number of hops was higher.
• When the hardware impairments were relaxed, we derived exact and asymptotic expressions of
the end-to-end SOP for the CMT and MDT protocols. We then performed computer simulations
to verify the derived expressions.
Author Contributions: P.T.T., D.T.H. and T.N.N. created the main ideas and executed the performance evaluation
by extensive simulations. T.T.D. and M.V. worked as the advisers of P.T.T., D.T.H. and T.N.N. to discuss, create,
and advise the main ideas and performance evaluations together.
Acknowledgments: This research received support from the grant SGS reg. No. SP2019/41 conducted at VSB
Technical University of Ostrava, Czech Republic and was partially funded by Vietnam National Foundation for
Science and Technology Development (NAFOSTED) under grant number 102.04-2017.317.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
References
1. Ledwaba, L.P.I.; Hancke, G.P.; Venter, H.S.; Isaac, S.J. Performance Costs of Software Cryptography in
Securing New-Generation Internet of Energy Endpoint Devices. IEEE Access 2018, 6, 9303–9323. [CrossRef]
2. Liu, Z.; Choo, K.-K.R.; Grossschadl, J. Securing Edge Devices in the Post-Quantum Internet of Things Using
Lattice-Based Cryptography. IEEE Commun. Mag. 2018, 56, 158–162. [CrossRef]
3. Wyner, A.D. The Wire-tap Channel. Bell Syst. Tech. J. 1975, 54, 1355–1387, [CrossRef]
4. Csiszar, I.; Korner, J. Broadcast Channels With Confidential Messages. IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 1978, 24,
339–348. [CrossRef]
5. Gopala, P.K.; Lai, L.; Gamal, H.E. On the secrecy capacity of fading channels. IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 2008, 54,
4687–4698. [CrossRef]
6. Zhang, J.; Duong, T.Q.; Woods, R.; Marshall, A. Securing Wireless Communications of the Internet of Things
from the Physical Layer, An Overview. Entropy 2017, 19, 420. [CrossRef]
7. Chang, S.; Li, J.; Fu, X.; Zhang, L. Energy Harvesting for Physical Layer Security in Cooperative Networks
Based on Compressed Sensing. Entropy 2017, 19, 462. [CrossRef]
8. Sun, L.; Du, Q. A Review of Physical Layer Security Techniques for Internet of Things: Challenges and
Solutions. Entropy 2018, 20, 730. [CrossRef]
9. Wang, L.; Wong, K.-K.; Jin, S.; Zheng, G.; Heath, R.W. A New Look at Physical Layer Security, Caching, and
Wireless Energy Harvesting for Heterogeneous Ultra-Dense Networks. IEEE Commun. Mag. 2018, 56, 49–55.
[CrossRef]
10. Kong, L.; Vuppala, S.; Kaddoum, G. Secrecy Analysis of Random MIMO Wireless Networks Over α-µ Fading
Channels. IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol. 2018, 67, 11654–11666. [CrossRef]
11. Jameel, F.; Wyne, S.; Kaddoum, G.; Duong, T.Q. A Comprehensive Survey on Cooperative Relaying and
Jamming Strategies for Physical Layer Security. IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutor. 2018. [CrossRef]
12. Krikidis, I. Opportunistic Relay Selection For Cooperative Networks With Secrecy Constraints. IET Commun.
2010, 4, 1787–1791. [CrossRef]
Entropy 2019, 21, 217 15 of 16
13. Zhong, B.; Zhang, Z. Secure Full-Duplex Two-Way Relaying Networks With Optimal Relay Selection.
IEEE Commun. Lett. 2017, 21, 1123–1126. [CrossRef]
14. Kuhestani, A.; Mohammadi, A.; Mohammadi, M. Joint Relay Selection and Power Allocation in Large-Scale
MIMO Systems With Untrusted Relays and Passive Eavesdroppers. IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2018, 13,
341–355. [CrossRef]
15. Hu, L.; Wen, H.; Wu, B.; Pan, F.; Liao, R.-F.; Song, H.; Tang, J.; Wang, X. Cooperative Jamming for Physical
Layer Security Enhancement in Internet of Things. IEEE Int. Things J. 2018, 5, 219–228. [CrossRef]
16. Ma, H.; Cheng, J.; Wang X.; Ma, P. Robust MISO Beamforming With Cooperative Jamming for Secure
Transmission From Perspectives of QoS and Secrecy Rate. IEEE Trans. Commun. 2018, 66, 767–780. [CrossRef]
17. Zhang, G.; Xu, J.; Wu, Q.; Cui, M.; Li, X.; Lin, F. Wireless Powered Cooperative Jamming for Secure OFDM
System. IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol. 2018, 67, 1331–1346. [CrossRef]
18. Hu, L.; Wen, H.; Wu, B.; Tang, J.; Pan, F.; Liao, R.-F. Cooperative-Jamming-Aided Secrecy Enhancement in
Wireless Networks With Passive Eavesdroppers. IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol. 2018, 67, 2108–2117. [CrossRef]
19. Singh, A.; Bhatnagar, M.R.; Mallik, R.K. Secrecy Outage of a Simultaneous Wireless Information and Power
Transfer Cognitive Radio System. IEEE Wirel. Commun. Lett. 2016, 5, 288–291. [CrossRef]
20. Lei, H.; Zhang, H.; Ansari, I.S.; Pan, G.; Qaraqe, K.A. Secrecy Outage Analysis for SIMO Underlay Cognitive
Radio Networks over Generalized-K Fading Channels. IEEE Sig. Process. Lett. 2016, 23, 1106–1110. [CrossRef]
21. Zhao, R.; Yuan, Y.; Fan, L.; He, Y.-C. Secrecy Performance Analysis of Cognitive Decode-and-Forward Relay
Networks in Nakagami-m Fading Channels. IEEE Trans. Commun. 2017, 65, 549–563. [CrossRef]
22. Chakraborty, P.; Prakriva, S. Secrecy Outage Performance of a Cooperative Cognitive Relay Network.
IEEE Commun. Lett. 2017, 21, 326–329. [CrossRef]
23. Al-Hraishawi, H.; Baduge, G.A.A.; Schaefer, R.F. Artificial Noise-Aided Physical Layer Security in Underlay
Cognitive Massive MIMO Systems with Pilot Contamination. Entropy 2017, 19, 349. [CrossRef]
24. Hung, T.; Georges, K.; Gagnon, F.; Louis, S. Cognitive Radio Network with Secrecy and Interference
Constraints. Phys. Commun. 2017, 22, 32–41.
25. Ping, X.; Ling, X.; Honghai, W.; Jung, T.S.; Ilsun, Y. Cooperative Jammer Selection for Secrecy Improvement
in Cognitive Internet of Things. Sensors 2018, 18, 42–57.
26. Feng, R.; Li, Q.; Zhang, Q.; Qin, J. Robust Secure Beamforming in MISO Full-Duplex Two-Way Secure
Communications. IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol. 2016, 65, 408–414. [CrossRef]
27. Sun, C.; Liu, K.; Zheng D.; Ai, W. Secure Communication for Two-Way Relay Networks with Imperfect CSI.
Entropy 2017, 19, 522. [CrossRef]
28. Jameel, F.; Wyne, S.; Ding, Z. Secure Communications in Three-Step Two-Way Energy Harvesting DF
Relaying. IEEE Commun. Lett. 2018, 22, 308–311. [CrossRef]
29. Zhang, J.; Tao, X.; Wu, H.; Zhang, X. Secure Transmission in SWIPT-Powered Two-Way Untrusted Relay
Networks. IEEE Access 2018, 6, 10508–10519 [CrossRef]
30. Lee, J.-H.; Sohn, I.; Kim, Y.-H. Transmit Power Allocation for Physical Layer Security in Cooperative
Multi-Hop Full-Duplex Relay Networks. Sensors 2016, 16, 1726. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
31. Alotaibi, E.R.; Hamdi, K.A. Secure Relaying in Multihop Communication Systems. IEEE Commun. Lett. 2016,
20, 1120–1123. [CrossRef]
32. Yao, J.; Liu, Y. Secrecy Rate Maximization With Outage Constraint in Multihop Relaying Networks.
IEEE Commun. Lett. 2018, 22, 304–307. [CrossRef]
33. Keshav, S; Ku, M.-L.; Biswas, S.; Ratnarajah, T. Energy-Efficient Subcarrier Pairing and Power Allocation for
DF Relay Networks with an Eavesdropper. Energies 2017, 10, 1953.
34. Björnson, E.; Matthaiou, M.; Debbah, M. A new look at dual-hop relaying: Performance limits with hardware
impairments. IEEE Trans. Commun. 2013, 61, 4512–4525. [CrossRef]
35. Matthaiou, M.; Papadogiannis, A. Two-Way Relaying Under The Presence of Relay Transceiver Hardware
Impairments. IEEE Commun. Lett. 2013, 17, 1136–1139. [CrossRef]
36. Björnson, E.; Hoydis, J.; Kountouris, M.; Debbah, M. Massive MIMO Systems With Non-Ideal Hardware:
Energy Efficiency, Estimation, and Capacity Limits. IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 2014, 60, 7112–7139. [CrossRef]
37. Guo, K.; Guo, D.; Zhang, B. Performance Analysis of Two-Way Multi-Antenna Multi-Relay Networks with
Hardware Impairments. IEEE Access 2017, 5, 15971–15980. [CrossRef]
38. Balti, E.; Guizani; M.; Hamdaoui, B.; Khalfi, B. Aggregate Hardware Impairments Over Mixed RF/FSO
Relaying Systems With Outdated CSI. IEEE Trans. Commun. 2018, 66, 1110–1123. [CrossRef]
Entropy 2019, 21, 217 16 of 16
39. Sharma, P.K.; Upadhyay, P.K. Cognitive relaying with transceiver hardware impairments under interference
constraints. IEEE Commun. Lett. 2016, 20, 820–823. [CrossRef]
40. Boulogeorgos, A.A.; Karas, D.S.; Karagiannidis, G.K. How Much Does I/Q Imbalance Affect Secrecy
Capacity? IEEE Commun. Lett. 2016, 20, 1305–1308. [CrossRef]
41. Zhu, J.; Ng, D.W.K.; Wang, N.; Schober, R.; Bhargava, V.K. Analysis and Design of Secure Massive MIMO
Systems in the Presence of Hardware Impairments. IEEE Trans. Wirel. Commun. 2017, 16, 2001–2016.
[CrossRef]
42. Boshkovska, E.; Ng, D.W.K.; Dai, L.; Schober, R. Power-Efficient and Secure WPCNs with Hardware
Impairments and Non-Linear EH Circuit. IEEE Trans. Commun. 2018, 66, 2642–2657. [CrossRef]
43. Kuhestani, A.; Mohamadi, A.; Wong, K.-K.; Yeoh, P.L.; Moradikia, M.; Khandaker, M.R.A. Optimal Power
Allocation by Imperfect Hardware Analysis in Untrusted Relaying Networks. IEEE Trans. Wirel. Commun.
2018, 17, 4302–4314. [CrossRef]
44. Tin, P.T.; Hung, D.T.; Duy, T.T.; Voznak, M. Analysis of Probability of Non-zero Secrecy Capacity for Multi-hop
Networks in Presence of Hardware Impairments over Nakagami-m Fading Channels. RadioEngineering 2016,
25, 774–782.
45. Wang, L.; Kim, K.J.; Duong, T.Q.; Elkashlan, M.; Poor, H.V. Security Enhancement of Cooperative Single
Carrier Systems. IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2015, 10, 90-103. [CrossRef]
46. Laneman, J.N.; Tse, D.N.C.; Wornell, G.W. Cooperative Diversity in Wireless Networks: Efficient Protocols
and Outage Behavior. IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 2004, 50, 3062–3080. [CrossRef]
47. Liu, P.; Tao, Z.; Lin, Z.; Erkip, E.; Panwar, S. Cooperative Wireless Communications: A Cross-layer Approach.
IEEE Wirel. Commun. 2006, 13, 84–92.
48. Bletsas, A.; Khisti, A.; Reed, D.P.; Lippman, A. Simple Cooperative Diversity Method based on Network
Path Selection. IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. 2006, 24, 659–672. [CrossRef]
49. Mo, J.; Tao, M.; Liu, Y. Relay Placement for Physical Layer Security: A Secure Connection Perspective.
IEEE Commun. Lett. 2012, 16, 878–881.
50. Cai, C.; Cai, Y.; Yang, W.; Yang, W. Secure Connectivity Using Randomize-and-Forward Strategy in
Cooperative Wireless Networks. IEEE Commun. Lett. 2013, 17, 1340–1343.
51. Vo, N.Q.B.; Duong, T.Q.; Tellambura, C. On the Performance of Cognitive Underlay Multihop Networks
with Imperfect Channel State Information. IEEE Trans. Commun. 2013, 61, 4864–4873.
c© 2019 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
